Tuesday, 10 April 2012

Discuss the ways in which music acts as a vector of cultural identity.


Initially, the remit of this paper addressed solely Zimbabwean Chimurenga music but it quickly became apparent that the ties to mbira music are too profound to be ignored. Therefore, in order to fully understand Chimurenga music’s role in preserving and modernizing Zimbabwean cultural identity, the importance of mbira music will first be assessed. This will be followed by a historical analysis of the emergence of Chimurenga music with particular attention to the intended purpose of the music. Finally, the problematic of modernization and change that the genre has undoubtedly undergone, will be examined.

            To begin with, it is crucial to bear in mind how interlinked the world of the living is with that of the dead in Shona culture. Without doubt, the most important use of the mbira is during a bira ceremony. A bira is a consultation with the ancestors to determine the cause of their dissatisfaction because the Shona believe that an affliction befalls them as a result of something they have done to displease the ancestors (Berliner, 1993, p.186). Indeed, Paul Berliner, the author of the seminal work, The Soul of the Mbira, points out that ‘the world of the living is a function of the workings of the spirit world’ (1978, p.186 cited in Preston, 2007). Chartwell Dutiro, a mbira musician, claims that during bira ceremonies he ‘became a pivot between people and spirits’ (Dutiro & Howard, 2007, p.3). It is immediately clear that the principal purpose of the mbira is not for entertainment but to appeal to the ancestors.
           
            Evidently, a great deal of cultural importance is attached to the bira ceremony and it is representative of the values of the Shona people. The notion of the familial and communal unity, a reoccurring trait of most African cultures, is particularly prominent throughout the ceremony. When a bira is held, the whole family comes together on land that was owned by the ancestor they are trying to consult (Berliner, 1993, p.188). At the beginning of the ceremony, other members of the community can seek guidance in the hope of resolving problems pertaining to their lives. Even the music of the bira is communal. People contribute by clapping, yodeling, chanting or singing and yet a sense of originality is not lost because each person has their own ‘voice’, or distinctive manner in which they contribute to the ceremony (Berliner, 1993, p. 190). Together the community moulds and shapes the music of the bira so much so that no two bira ceremonies are the same (Berliner, 1993, p.205).

What is more, the bira tradition maintains the lineage of a given family. Ancestors have preferred songs, therefore, the musicians must have a vast repertoire that spans several years in order to entice a particular ancestor (Preston, 2007). In this manner, ancestors are not forgotten and neither is the music of past bira ceremonies. Above all, bira ceremonies keep the ethics and morals of a community in check. During the consultation with the ancestors, other members of the community are permitted to voice their opinion on the topic at hand. The deliberation is influenced by all those present. It is a frank and open discussion; a time for reflection. The bira ceremony is very much an opportunity to strengthen or renew the sense of common identity, unity and solidarity within a community (Berliner, 1993, p.205-206). In sum, mbira music is loaded for it evokes the communal, historical and ethical connotations of the bira ceremony.

            Over time, Chimurenga music’s purpose has evolved. Its changing nature is inextricably linked to historical events that have shaped modern day Zimbabwe. The word Chimurenga means either ‘resistance’, ‘uprising’ (McLaughlin & Moorcraft, 1982, p.1) or as is more commonly suggested ‘struggle’ (Locke, 1984, p.135). In the first instance, it is important to understand the legacy of colonialism in relation to music and cultural identity. Throughout Africa, colonialism had a distorting and destructive impact and Zimbabwe is no exception. Music with mystical and spiritual functions, such as the mbira, was repressed and banned from being played in public by missionaries who labeled it as satanic or pagan (Ewens, 2007, p. 172). The missionaries also brought with them the guitar and church hymns, which were to have profound impacts on Chimurenga music. Furthermore, during the colonial era, people who lived on the most fertile land were resettled in order to make way for white settlers. People were moved away from their ancestral lands thus rendering bira ceremonies less meaningful and obscuring one of the foundations of Zimbabwean cultural identity. In essence, colonialism was the ‘triumph of a foreign ideology’ (Chitando, 2002, p.49-53 and p.91, cited in Preston, 2007, p.23).

The term ‘Chimurenga’ is also used to refer to wars. The First Chimurenga (1896-1897) was a joint Shona-Ndebele rebellion against the British South Africa Company, which resulted in British victory (McLaughlin & Moorcraft, 1982, p.3-5). The Second Chimurenga began in 1965 with Prime Minister Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and ended in 1980 with the establishment of the Republic of Zimbabwe (McLaughlin & Moorcraft, 1982, p.15-17). It was in the context of the Second Chimurenga that Chimurenga music rose to prominence.

In effect, British colonial rule ended with UDI but this was not Smith’s sole goal. In so doing, Smith hoped to prevent both the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe, and the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, from establishing a black-majority government (Ewens, 1991, p.172). Smith is often quoted as having said ‘never in 1,000 years will there be a black leader of Rhodesia’ (Konkouris, 2007, p.12). From this statement, it is inferred that Smith was opposed to any black rule but some have pointed out that he did not rule out the possibility of a power-sharing government (Godwin, 2007). Nonetheless, this policy of exclusion was met with resistance and armed conflict. Throughout Africa liberation struggles were beginning. Indeed, there was, as Harold Macmillan recognized, a ‘wind of change’ sweeping through the continent (Hollings, 1971, p.49). It was in this context that many Chimurenga artists grew up and that the genre itself was born.

Contrary to popular belief, Chimurenga music is not nationalistic. To claim so is a mischaracterization for it is much broader in its scope. It incorporates elements of empowerment and freedom, not solely from an oppressive apartheid system but also from everyday problems of poverty, lack of education, distorted culture and the suchlike (Scannel, 2001, p.23). This misconception arises from the fact that during the Second Chimurenga, the intentions of politicians and musicians were temporarily aligned. Parties like ZANU and ZAPU used Chimurenga music to get their message across and thought that with independence in the 1980s they would maintain popular support and legitimacy through music (Pongweni, 1982 cited in Vambe, 2000, p.75). Perhaps the most popular and well known Chimurenga musician, Thomas Mapfumo, states that he does not sing for politicians but rather for the people (Eyre, 1991 cited in Locke, 2002, p.136).

Mapfumo grew up during the Second Chimurenga. As a child, he recalled listening to artists such as Frank Sinatra, the Beatles, Elvis Presley and the Rolling Stones on the radio. However, Mapfumo speaks of a disconnect between the music he heard on the radio and the traditional music he would hear in his village (Mapfumo, 2008). His musical career began by playing covers of foreign rock songs. Mapfumo attempts to explain the impact of the colonial legacy by claiming that ‘as a people who had lost our culture, it was very difficult to get it back’ (Eyre, 1991 cited in Locke, 2002, p.135). Though one might object to the use of the term ‘lost’, it must be conceded that the Western music scene was much more prominent at the time (Dutiro & Howard, 2007, p.4). According to Mapfumo there came a point when he ‘realised [he] was an African’ and that ‘[he] had a culture to look after’ (Mapfumo, 2008). Similarly, Dutiro deplored the fact that a guitar player was paid more than an mbira player in Zimbabwe and he says of moving to Britain that ‘you can take me out of place where I grew up, but you can’t take the place out of me’ (Dutiro & Howard, 2007, p.5). Certainly, during the Second Chimurenga, there was an emerging consensus, or a realization that music had a duty to preserve Shona culture. This, in tandem with the struggle for liberation, was the crux of the Chimurenga music’s message.

In 1973, Mapfumo stopped doing covers of Western songs and created the ‘Hallelujah Chicken Run Band’, which fused Western rock with African rhythms. It was a sort of Afro-rock that used electric guitars to mimic the sound of the mbira and included yodels (Ewens, 1991, p.178; Bender, 1991, p.163). He also started playing updated versions of traditional songs about people liberating themselves. One of the most seditious songs was entitled ‘send your children to war’, which got Mapfumo arrested. The Smith government tried to censor Mapfumo’s music but instead of quelling its proliferation, the opposite effect was achieved because it bolstered its appeal and granted it more creditability or legitimacy (Bender, 1991, p.161; Locke, 2002, p.135; Ewens, 1991, p.177). Also, the colonial authorities only banned a song once they realized it was becoming popular among rebel fighters because Mapfumo, subversively sung in Shona, which they could not understand (Locke, 2002, p.160-161). Under fire from the state, Mapfumo’s songs got smarter and he buried his message behinds several layers of meaning (Ewens, 1991, p.177).

With the advent of guerilla radio stations Chimurenga music’s popularity grew further. In 1974, ZANU established a radio station in Mozambique called the ‘Voice of Zimbabwe’, whose flagship programme was ‘Chimurenga Requests’ (Ewens, 1991, p.177). In a similar vein, ZAPU used Radio Zambia, Radio Tanzania and Radio Cairo to recruit fighters and to characterize the Second Chimurenga as a struggle between the white minority and the black majority (Bender, 1991, p. 160). Once songs made it onto these various radio stations, Smith’s government banned them. As a consequence, many Chimurenga artists’ songs went straight to the shops (Ewens, 1991, p.179).

Independence changed everything. Chimurenga music declined in popularity because it had accomplished what it set out to do (Locke, 2002, p.136). Many thought that it had lost its main impetus or raison d’ĂȘtre when it ceased being censored (Bender, 1991, p. 159). Yet again, this assumption rests on the misguided perception that Chimurenga music was solely political. Politicians misguidedly thought they could continue to use Chimurenga music as a means of controlling the masses (Vambe, 2000, p.75). Significantly, the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement, which brought independence to Zimbabwe, did not bring peace (Konkouris, 2007, 13). Though ZAPU and ZANU had fought together during the Second Chimurenga, after independence, they turned on each other. This resulted in the Matabeleland massacres, more commonly known as Gukurahundi where the Ndebele, who supported Joshua Nkomo, were killed by ZANU’s armed wing. The massacres ended with merger of ZANU and ZAPU to form ZANU-PF. Effectively, Mugabe had consolidated power (Mapfumo, 2008). These events were the fuel that Chimurenga music was propelled by after liberation. They simply adopted a new struggle, in its broader sense and there were many to choose from. Mapfumo sang about the corruption of the Mugabe government (Eyre, 1991 cited in Locke, 2002, p.136), Gukurahundi (Mapfumo, 2008) and bemoaned how far leaders had come since the ideals and rhetoric of the liberation period. Paul Matavire questioned the paradox that poverty existed in the midst of Mugabe’s supposedly socialist project. Oliver Mtukudzi lamented the loss of community spirit. Nicholas Zacharria deplored the emerging tribal divisions between the Shona and Ndebele in Matabeleland. Leonard Zhakata spoke of the effect of the adoption of Structural Adjustment Policies by the Mugabe government (Vambe, 2000, 77-8). Also, in the wake of liberation, Bob Marley played at a concert in Harare which spurred the emergence of a budding Zimbabwean Reggae and Rastafarian scene, which very much sympathized with the broad notion of struggle. Mapfumo once said ‘we will never stop singing about the struggle,’ (Eyre, 1991 cited in Locke, 2002, p.136) this was because, quite plainly, struggles are everywhere.

Moreover, Chimurenga music underwent a process of gradual evolution. From a relatively narrow message concerned with achieving liberation and promoting Shona culture, to a broader scope, which incorporated the various aforementioned struggles. What Mapfumo and other Chimurenga musicians grappled with, was the problematic of modernization without destruction. That is to say, creating an ideal blend or striking the perfect balance, which both preserves and rejuvenates cultural identity (Brusila, 2002, p.44 cited in Preston, 2007, p. 21). For it is true that music reconstructs and restores cultural identity. In the same way that mbira music and the bira ceremonies that it evokes moulds or shapes a community, so Chimurenga music seeks to critique Zimbabwean society in an enriching manner (Preston, 2007, p. 20). It has assumed the mantle of mbira music both by adapting the electric guitar to sound like mbira and by adopting the communal, historical and ethical functions of traditional Shona music (Bender, 1991, p.165). This is why one cannot begin to understand Chimurenga music if it is detached from its mbira roots. For Chartwell, this has interesting ramifications. He questions whether the guitar has now become indigenized and asks at what point does something foreign, when altered, become Zimbabwean? Does it still maintain the spiritual connection that the mbira evokes (Preston, 2007, p.22-23)? These are thought-provoking questions and the answer depends very much on the manner in which one perceives cultural identity. Is it, as Stuart Hall posits, a changing concept that can be modernised or rather, as Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe would have us think, is it in fact a resolutely monolithic entity (Hall, 1994; Ekwe-Ekwe, 2001). Chartwell subscribes to the latter, claiming that only the mbira can create a spiritual connection but again, the answer very much depends on which side of this age-old argument one falls. What is sure, is that Chimurenga music successfully managed to create a new paradigm of modernization without destruction and in so doing, pinpointed the most pressing dilemma in defining Zimbabwean cultural identity (Scannel, 2001, p.23).

In conclusion, Chimurenga music does act as a vector of cultural identity. It does this my mirroring mbira music and thus conjuring up the traditional communal, historical and ethical functions associated with bira ceremonies. It also is deeply grounded in the historical aspects of the evolution of modern-day Zimbabwe. Changes in the genre are intrinsically related to historical issues pertinent at the time. These have changed overtime as Zimbabwean society concerns itself with new struggles not just solely the struggle for liberation, with which it tends to be most commonly associated. To be sure, Chimurenga music always has a message. Lyrics are never void of meaning and there is an inherent positivism in the style that aims to further develop cultural identity through critiquing the status quo.

Bibliography
Bender, Wolfgang. Sweet Mother: Modern African Music. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Berliner, Paul. The Soul of Mbira: music and traditions of the Shona people of Zimbabwe. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993.

Chartwell Dutiro, Keith Howard. "Chosen by the Ancestors." Chartwell Dutiro, Keith Howard. Zimbabwean Mbira Music on an International Stage. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 1-7.

Ekwe-Ekwe, Herbert. African Literature in Defence of History: an essay on Chinua Achebe. Dakar: African Renaissance, 2001.

Ewens, Graeme. Africa O-Ye! Enfield: Guinness, 1991.

Godwin, Peter. If only Ian Smith had shown some imagination, then more of his people might live at peace. 25 November 2007. 5 April 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/nov/25/comment.zimbabwe>.

Hall, Stuart. "Cultural Identity and Diaspora." Patrick Williams, Laura Chrisman. Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 392-403.

Hollings, Jill. African Nationalism . London: Granta, 1971.

Konkouris, Theodore. "The History and Politics of Zimbabwe." Chartwell Dutiro, Keith Howard. Zimbabwean Mbira Music on the World Stage. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 9-15.

Locke, David. "Ewe, Mande, Dagbamba, Shona, BaAka." Titon, Jeff Todd. Worlds of Music: An Introduction to the Music. New York: Schirmer Books, 2002. 89-150.

Mapfumo, Thomas. Guestbook: Thomas Mapfumo Bennetta Jules-Rosette. University of California San Diego (UCSD), 3 November 2008.

Paul Moorcraft, Peter McLaughlin. Chimurenga! The war in Rhodesia, 1965-1980: a military history. Marshalltown: Sygma/Collins, 1982.

Preston, Thomas M. "Spiritual Continuity Amongst Musical Change." Chartwell Dutiro, Keith Howard. Zimbabwean Mbira Music on the World Stage. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007. 17-25.

Scannel, Paddy. "Music, Radio and the Record Business in Zimbabwe Today." Popular Musicz 20 (2001): 13-27.

Vambe, Maurice Taonezvi. "Popular Songs and Social Realities in Post-Independence Zimbabwe." African Studies Review 43.2 (2000): 73-86.

Friday, 16 March 2012

Ethiopia-America Relations

I think you can read into this somewhat. Ethiopia appears to be getting increasingly comfortable in the region in the knowledge that it has America on its side. For the US, is one of the few receptive and powerful allies that it can count on, even though its lead by a dictator.

Thursday, 8 March 2012

One thing is for sure, KONY2012's slogan, 'one thing we can all agree on', looks just a tad naive...

In favour:


Against:

News articles, blog posts, reports, etc... that have been refloated:

Tuesday, 6 March 2012

KONY2012


Conflicts in Africa are tend to be portrayed in a very simplistic manner in the media and that is part of the risk with the new KONY 2012 campaign. The narrative focuses on the story of the producer more than on the issue at hand. Though undoubtedly bringing an under-reported issue to light for many, it masks some of the more complex reasons for American interest in Uganda and dangerously simplifies the present situation in Uganda.

So what are the real motives behind American involvement? Is it solely out of compassion and a humanitarian impulse that Obama expanded AFRICOM's remit in Uganda? Of course, these days there it is in fashion to concede that humanitarian action is increasingly linked to foreign policy. DFID makes no secret of the fact that about 30% of its aid has a security objective for Britain and its allies. So what are the security threats that the LRA pose directly to the US? The answer is evidently none. They have no wish to launch international attacks. So why the American interest? Some have suggested, fairly outlandishly in my opinion, that the discovery of oil in Uganda may play a part. Others claim that this may be compensation for Ugandan involvement in Somalia, where America's security is certainly at risk. In return, America is providing assistance with Ugandan problems. Yet, the Ugandan army are not saints, neither is Museveni who is showing all the traits of an emerging dictator.


American intervention in Africa has always been cautious since the famous Black Hawk Down saga that has prevented interventions in Rwanda during the genocide and currently in Somalia. The risk of failure and the wish not to be portrayed as neo-imperialists are the main deterrents. The new feeling that the solution to African problems should be homegrown has risen in popularity, shrinking the space for legitimate and popular foreign intervention.

I suppose this leaves the question of how to deal with the LRA? Again, there is no straight forward answer to the problem but I can't help but draw parallels between Joseph Kony and Laurent Nkunda. The effort to capture him was a joint Congolese-Rwandan venture, which proved to be successful. Could the same be done with the LRA? Afterall, it is not solely a Ugandan problem so perhaps a joint task force comprised of Uganda-South Sudan-CAF-DRC soldiers could be created. Hopefully, Kony is captured and sent to the ICC but the risks are twofold. He could be killed, meaning that someone else might take his place or the problem of where and how to try him might arise, as it has done for Nkunda.

Though many problems arise from this movie, I think increasing public awareness  of the issue (however limited or even downright false) is crucial and productive. The more people know, the more they will seek to find out and perhaps in due course we might get somewhat closer to finding a lasting and durable solution.

Friday, 2 March 2012

‘Educational expansion in Kerala has done little to promote development.’ Discuss.


Kerala has a long history of high investment in education, achieving an expenditure of over 6% of State Domestic Product (SDP) in the 1980s (Tharamangalam, 1998, p.8), which has led to some impressive educational statistics. So much so that some have even questioned whether or not these statistics are really the result of investment in education, or rather because the value of education is culturally engrained in the very fabric of Kerala’s society (Jeffrey cited in Simister, 2011, p.9). At the current juncture, Kerala has a high level of human development and yet, there exists a paradox in its development. Namely, how is it that such a high level of human development has been achieved, whilst economic development has not occurred? In particular, this essay will examine the measurement of education’s role in development (this includes economic and human development) and then proceed to analyse how this has been applied in practice in Kerala.

The measurement of the role of education in development

To begin with, early thinking about education centred mainly on the incentive for the individual and treated the decision to undertake education, at all levels, as a purely rational, self-motivated decision. Adam Smith theorised that skills learnt from education will pay off the cost of that education and improve the earning potential of the individual (cited in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004, p.1). Early thinking was very much based on the private benefits that accrue from education and saw it as individuals consuming a service but there has been a shift in the economics of education, from a focus on the private benefits to the inclusion of social benefits of education and to regarding education as a form of investment in human capital. 

The principle method of gauging the impact of education is through a cost-benefit analysis, which takes into account the Private Rate Of Return (PROR) and the Social Rate Of Return (SROR). In calculating the PROR and SROR, the costs of education have to be factored in, which are threefold: the cost of education to the individual (tuition, books, etc...), the opportunity cost (earnings forgone whilst in education) and the cost of education to society as a whole (providing buildings, teachers, etc...) (Shultz, 1960, p.4). Simply put, the PROR is thus expressed as, 

[Earnings (after tax)] – [earnings forgone + cost of education to the individual]
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004, p.4).
The SROR is somewhat harder to define because of the notion of ‘market externalities’, which are spillovers or side-effects that are economically measureable and impact upon others in society (not just the individual), either positively or negatively. For this reason, there is a ‘narrow’ definition of the SROR and a ‘wide’ definition. The narrow SROR is expressed as,

[Earnings (after tax)] – [earnings forgone + the cost of education to the individual + the cost of education to society]
The wide SROR is expressed as,

[Earnings (after tax) + market externalities] – [earnings forgone + the cost of education to the individual + the cost of education to society]
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004, p.3).
 Now that PRORs and SRORs have been defined some of the trends in the economics of education and their implications can be explored.

Implications of trends in the measurement of the role of education in development

In the first instance, it should be understood that the PROR tends to exceed the narrow SROR through all levels of education. The degree of difference between them reflects the quantity of public subsidisation (cost of education to society). Some claim government subsidization is excessive and that students should be made to bear more of the costs themselves, as it is they who benefit the most (Bennell, 1996, p.183). Of course, this measure only takes into account the narrow SROR. If the wide SROR is used, the SROR may well be higher than the PROR because of market externalities (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 2004, p.21). The main problem here is that it is extremely difficult to measure the market externalities. It is yet more difficult to measure non-market externalities, which tend to be those that impact the most upon human development. These include such things as low fertility, low infant mortality, improved sanitation, low crime, increased political participation, environmental protection and an improved status of women (Colclough, et al., 2009, p.3). One of the main criticisms of using cost-benefit analysis to determine the impact of education on development is that it uses a purely economic measurement. It is a neoliberal approach because it focuses on achieving growth and the efficient allocation of scarce resources, without any concern for the social implications of investment in education (Bennel, 1996, p.2).

Furthermore, both PROR and SROR tend to decrease as a country develops because the law of diminishing returns applies to education too. When a country is developing, there exists a large demand for a relatively unskilled labour force, yielding high wages and a high rate of return to education (RORE). As human capital becomes more educated and more skilled, the demand for skilled workers and their incomes falls, as does the RORE. This is useful in that education is a sure bet when a country is developing, it can profit from what Gerschenkron called the ‘advantages of backwardness’ (Szirmai, 2005, p.127). The RORE (this includes both PROR and SROR) of primary education are especially high, followed by secondary education and finally tertiary education (Psacharopoulos cited in Bennell, 1996, p.1). As a consequence, primary education receives the most amount of funding in developing countries rather than focusing on technical or vocational training. Yet, a study by Behrmen et al. of Latin America illustrated that the RORE to primary education and secondary had fallen over time, whilst the RORE of tertiary education had risen (cited in Colclough et al., 2009, p.2). This change in RORE can be traced in the development of the economy. That is to say, as the structure of Latin American countries shifted from an agricultural-based economy to a manufacturing-based economy, the labour market demanded more skilled workers and thus the primary RORE fell, whilst tertiary RORE rose. The decline in primary RORE was also because of the introduction of universal primary education. This may have two effects. Firstly, as more students complete primary education, so the wages fall. Secondly, the quality of education is reduced as the teacher-student ratio increases. Therefore, a falling primary RORE is good if the structure of the economy and its employment needs are changing but bad if the quality of education is worsening.

In other words, the importance of primary education in achieving development declines in importance overtime (Colclough et al., 2009, p.2). Evidently, many find this conclusion wanting and several critiques of note have been made. Firstly, there is what Weisbrod (cited in Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 2004, p.19) calls the ‘optional value of education’, whereby you cannot disaggregate the process of education and quantify the RORE for primary, secondary and tertiary education separately. In some way, primary education contributes to the secondary education of the individual and RORE calculations do not consider this. Secondly, if primary education is not a right, it is a merit good and on this basis alone some claim that funding is justified, regardless of its RORE. Thirdly, there is the problem of ignoring the social externalities of education.

In sum, using PROR as well as narrow and wide SROR, only measures the impact of education upon economic development. To measure the impact of education on human development non-market externalities need to be examined, which are very difficult to measure and attribute solely to education.

The nature of the problem: education as a hindrance to economic development

At this point in time, Kerala’s development has hit a glass ceiling leading some to claim that it is anti-growth. It is a well known fact that Kerala has undoubtedly achieved human development thanks to education (Simister, 2011; Ramachandran, 1997; CDS, 2005) but changes need to be made in order to breakthrough and achieve economic development. It is not the system that is failing; it is simply failing to be reformed and different methods have been put forward to achieve economic growth but first the nature of the problem must be explained (Tharamangalam, 1998, p. 9-10).

Politics

Kerala has long been a very left-leaning state and as a result, there has traditionally been a very large welfare state and civil service. The problem is that Kerala does not generate enough revenue to sustain the current level of expenditure on the civil service and its social policies. What is more, Kerala has met most of the human development targets set by the state and does not receive any further funding. Human development is now being held back by a lack of economic development. Another consequence of left-wing policies has been the emergence of labour militancy in the form of powerful trade unions that resist reform and discourage companies from setting up shop in Kerala. It has been argued that strong trade unions, in the case of Kerala, stifle innovation, modernisation and entrepreneurship (Tharamangalam, 1998, p.5-6). Alternatively, it could be the fear of a communist government rather than a fear of trade unions that is keeping investors away. Some also suggest, the civil service is bloated and distorts incentives by not permitting the workforce to maximise their earnings and realise their full potential, as they would do in a free market (Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 2004 p.12).

Remittances

Kerala has a net out migration, mainly to the Gulf region and subsequently remittances are a large component in Kerala’s economy. Between 1978 and 1979, remittances accounted for 30% of SDP (Krishnan cited in Ramachandran, 1997, p.219). Remittances are problematic in that they cause dependence and inflation. They are inflationary because this transfer payment is normally used to buy household goods, driving up consumption without the economy actually having produced anything. In addition, remittances cannot be taxed, further diminishing the size of Kerala’s already small tax base (Tharamangalam, 1998, p.4). However, there are those who argue that remittances have been a boon for Kerala’s development. Zachariah et al. (1999, p.4) go as far as to claim that migration is the single factor that has contributed the most to Kerala’s development.

Education

One of the problems with Kerala’s education is that it does not provide an education that meets the needs of Kerala’s labour needs. In effect, there is a mismatch or disequilibrium between the available supply of workers and the actual demand for workers (Tharamangalam, 1998, p. 8). Also, there is the problem of ‘diploma disease’, that is to say, though the educational level is very high, the quality of the degrees that Keralites obtain is not. Over-education can be bad if it is of poor quality and not suited to the needs of the economy. This means that even though Kerala makes up 4% of India’s population it accounts for 16% of its unemployment and those who are unemployed are often, very well educated. There are shortages of labour in certain industries in Kerala but such jobs are poorly regarded and come with a social stigma attached, thus unemployment exists even when there is a shortage of labour. Government and civil service jobs are the prize postions that Keralites strive for (Tharamangalam, 1998, p.6-7). Moreover, there is a diminishing impact to education in Kerala. Rosenzweig (cited in Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 2004, p.15) carried out a study comparing schooled and unschooled farmers in Punjab to those in Kerala. The finding was that the profit differential between the two groups was 39.2% in Punjab and only 11.4% in Kerala. This shows that there is a higher wage gap in a state where education is less developed, mainly because there is a higher demand for educated workers.

All of the aforementioned problems have lead to economic stagnation and explain why Kerala’s SDP was a mere 1.4% between 1960 and 1996 (Dasgupta et al. cited in Tilak, 2001, p.4) and also why Kerala has an average income per capita of Rs. 636 in 1986, when the Indian average was Rs. 798 (Tharamangalam, 1998, p.5). The truth of the matter is, Kerala simply has not reformed its economy. Several propositions have been put forward and will be examined in the next section.

Solutions to the problem: how education can promote economic development

            First of all, a justification must be made because although this section may seem somewhat outside the remit of this paper, it is important in understanding how education, amongst other things, has constrained economic development.

            One argument is that educational funding has not been focused enough on higher education. Some argue that because unemployment is high amongst the well educated, less should be invested in higher education. Nonetheless, part of the reason that there are so few employment opportunities is because of the poor standard of that education and the prevalence of ‘diploma disease’ (Tilak, 2001, p.23-24). Others believe that renewed investment in primary education is the way forward but as has been discussed, RORE to primary education fall over time and the gains mainly impact upon human development. If Kerala is to grow economically, it needs to match the shift in the demand for labour or even pre-empt it, by expanding the level of education, which will provide the most skilled workers i.e. tertiary education. Higher education is positively correlated with economic growth and furthermore, no economically developed country has a tertiary enrolment rate lower than 20% (Tilak, 2001, p.6-7). 

On the other hand, Veron (2001) suggests that the solution to economic stagnation lies in bottom up, community-led initiatives and democratic decentralisation, with a focus on the environment in order to create genuine sustainable development. The issue of low production and industrialisation used to be left to the state and central government but by bolstering participation through community-led intiatives, these become local issues. Also, by advocating the joint interest in achieving growth, trade union power can be reduced. There is a gradual shift from focusing on welfare to participatory growth. This is what Easterly (2007) calls ‘searching’ as opposed to imposing solutions from above, which he terms ‘planning’. Education plays a fairly minor role in Veron’s vision of how to solve Kerala’s current problem, which highlights the multifarious nature of Kerala’s economic stagnation. Just as the problem is not solely the fault of education, so the solution too must not rely uniquely on education.

            In conclusion, educational expansion has definitely contributed to promoting human development but not so much for economic development and may indeed have hindered it. Currently, Kerala has hit a glasss ceiling because human development is being held back by a lack of economic development. Kerala, by virtue of its political and cultural makeup, constucted a society that valued human development over economic development and now needs to set about rectifying this. Above all, this simply goes to show that there are many routes to achieving development or more simply put, there is more than one way to cook an egg.

 Bibliography

Bennell, Paul. "Rates of Return to Education: Does the Conventional Pattern Prevail in sub-Saharan Africa?" World Development 24.1 (1996): 183-199.
Centre for Development Studies (CDS). Kerala Human Development Report. Government Report. Thiruvananthapuram: Government of Kerala, 2005.
Christopher Colclough, Geeta Kingdon, Harry Patrinos. The Patterns to Education and its Implications. Policy Brief. Cambridge: RECOUP, April 2009.
Easterly, William. The White Man's Burden: why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
George Psacharopoulos, Harry Patrinos. "Human capital and rates of return." G Johnes, J Johnes. International Handbook on the Economics of Education. London: Elgar, 2004. 1-57.
K.C. Zachariah, E.T. Mathew, S.R. Rajan. "Impact of Migration on Kerala's Economy and Society." Working Paper. October 1999.
Ramachandran, V.K. "On Kerala's development achievements." Jean Dreze, Amartya Sen. Indian Development: Selected Regional Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford Univertsity Press, 1997. 205-328.
Shultz, Theodore. "Capital Formation by Education." Journal of Political Economy 68.6 (1960): 571-583.
Simister, John. "Assessing the 'Kerala Model': Education is Necessary but Not Sufficient." Journal of South Asian Development 6.1 (2011): 1-24.
Szirmai, Adam. The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Tharamangalam, Joseph. "The perils of social development without economic growth: the development debacle of Kerala." Bullentin of Concerned Asian Scholars 30.1 (1998): 23-34.
Tilak, Jandhyala. Higher Education and Development in Kerala. Working Paper. Kochi: Centre for Socio-economic & Environmental Studies, February 2001.
Veron, Rene. "The 'New' Kerala Model: Lessons for Sustainable Development." World Development 29.4 (2001): 601-617.


Critically discuss the following statement: ‘Trade liberalisation is a precondition for economic growth in developing countries’.


With the advent of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s, came a new way of thinking about development. Trade liberalisation was one part of this new emerging doctrine, which differed from previous paradigms in the rigour with which it was applied. In effect, the Neoliberal modus operandi was imposed on developing countries through the use of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs). All this was done in the hope that economic growth would be achieved. This essay will begin by examining the rationale behind trade liberalisation and then proceed to assess the arguments made against it.

To begin with, the term ‘trade liberalisation’ is not a well-defined term. Obstacles to trade are numerous and cannot be limited to quotas, subsidies and tariffs. For example, if a government banned foreign companies from competing in a certain industry, it could be argued that this is in fact a form of subsidy to domestic producers, as they no longer have to compete with cheaper foreign goods. In this example, the line between government regulation and protectionism is blurred and entangled. By the same token, deregulation and trade liberalisation oftentimes go hand in glove and one should bear this in mind when assessing trade liberalisation as a precondition to economic growth.

Neoliberals tend to espouse the idea that trade liberalisation is mutually beneficial. They cite the Ricardian law of comparative advantage as the main reason for this (World Bank, 1997, p. 72). That is to say, countries should specialize in the production of certain goods and then trade with each other so that both parties can make gains that they could not previously achieve (Lewis, 1954, p. 444). Take the following example, of a world economy consisting of two countries that produce only steel and cotton. Figure 1.0, illustrates their respective output prior to specialisation.

Figure 1.0 (Before Specialisation)

Steel (‘000 tonnes)
Cotton (‘000 tonnes)
Country A
20
35
Country B
50
25
‘World Total’
70
60

For Country A, the opportunity cost of switching from steel production to only cotton production is 1 : 1.75 and for Country B, the opportunity cost of switching cotton production to only steel production is 1 : 2. Figure 2.0 shows the effect of specialisation once each country’s opportunity cost has been factored in.

Figure 2.0 (After Specialisation and Before Trade)

Steel (‘000 tonnes)
Cotton (‘000 tonnes)
Country A
0
70
Country B
100
0
‘World Total’
100
70

If we assume there is a trading rate of 1 steel to 0.8 cotton (1 : 0.8) and that Country B is willing and able to trade 40 tonnes of steel, then Figure 3.0 illustrates the gains that can be achieved through trade.

Figure 3.0 (After Both Specialisation Trade)

Steel (‘000 tonnes)
Cotton (‘000 tonnes)
Country A
40
38
Country B
60
32
‘World Total’
100
70

Figure 3.0 shows that in this scenario, both countries are better off than they were in Figure 1.0 (economic growth has been achieved) and that trade is mutually beneficial. 

However, this is not the only justification used to encourage developing countries to open up to trade. A whole raft of other reasons are touted by Neoliberals including: interconnectedness with the global economy, access to new markets, a reduced likelihood of war due to better international cooperation and above all, efficiency gains. There is a resolute belief that the free market can determine the equilibrium price of goods to the benefit of consumers and producers alike and do away with market distortions brought on by government intervention, which tampers with price signals (Lipton, 1977). Free markets will, in time, force domestic industries to become more competitive, increase productivity and adopt new technologies, as well as purchase cheap foreign inputs. The above measures, it is believed, will achieve economic growth. (European Commision For Trade, 2006, p. 1).

Furthermore, the influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is also viewed favourably. It can bring: an injection of capital to fill the savings gap followed by a multiplier effect, employment, foreign know-how, new skills for the workforce, the creation of infrastructure, competition for inefficient local industries and Research and Development (R&D). What is more, there is a ‘honeypot effect’ as FDI attracts yet more FDI, further increasing the potential for growth. The proliferation of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) has also, in the past, brought new technologies such as the High-Yielding Varieties (HYV) of seeds that spurred growth during the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s or more recently, through the use of Genetically Modified (GM) crops.
On the other hand, there are various critiques of the supposed benefits of opening up to the international market. Comparative advantage has several fairly major limitations because of the assumptions it makes. It assumes that the production of different goods is interchangeable, whereas in reality, factors of production are not usually mobile. It also assumes that: there are no transport costs, consumers do not look at quality and reputation of goods, there is a demand for an increase in production, structural unemployment does not exist, jingoism does not exist and there are no diseconomies of scale. The theory of comparative advantage is exactly that, a theory and if those who promote it had there way, developing countries would continue to export labour-intensive products (cotton in the model) and not venture towards the more lucrative capital-intensive sector (steel).

In addition, the repercussions of an influx of FDI along with, the removal of trade barriers, are also not as rosy as neoliberals tend to depict. One need only look at Nigeria and the devastation caused to the Niger Delta to see the effect upon the environment of opening up to FDI without proper regulation. In the last fifty years, approximately fifty times the quantity of oil spilt by the Exxon Valdez incident has been split into the Niger delta (Vidal, 2010). Where unregulated MNCs are concerned, environmental degradation is all too common and they can also become dominant in a market by creating monopolies, enabling them to set wage levels and suppress local industries, rather than foster competition. This leads to the exploitation of the labour force and the destruction of nascent industries. It is argued that action to promote ‘infant industries’ should be twofold. Firstly, they should be protected by tariffs and import quotas and secondly, they should be given time and subsidies to develop in order to become internationally competitive. One of the principal components of economic growth is the movement from upstream activities (extraction or cultivation) to downstream activities (refining, packaging and marketing) and protecting industries gives them a chance to develop such capacities but this requires time. Proponents of the free market are blinkered by the pursuit of short run efficiency gains. Where the benefits of FDI do accrue, has a tendency to be very localized, around the capital city for instance, thus creating a ‘spillover effect’, as people flock to the cities and establish informal settlements around this growth pole. More often than not, the profits that MNCs accumulate are wholly repatriated and the local population does not reap the benefits of their own resources. If not properly regulated, FDI can do more harm than good to economic growth.

The removal of trade barriers can also have detrimental effects. It can lead to structural unemployment, as entire industries are unable to compete with cheap international goods. For example, Detroit’s car industry ultimately failed because it could not produce cheaper cars than those being imported from the Far East. Developing countries are also left vulnerable to dumping, a practice whereby developed countries flood developing markets with excess produce, sometimes below their production cost, thereby undercutting domestic industries. Moreover, tariffs can be a major source of revenue for a developing country and can diminish the government’s budget, if removed. All this begs the question, does trade liberalisation really achieve economic growth and if one still maintains that it does, at what cost?

In summation, it has been noted that trade liberalisation can have both a positive and a negative impact upon economic growth and development but what has been the case in the past? Can a country grow and develop without liberalising trade? The answer from the IMF is a resounding ‘No’. It claims that, ‘No country in recent decades has achieved economic success, in terms of substantial increases in living standards for its people, without being open to the rest of the world’ (2001). By contrast Ha-Joon Chang argues that Britain, America, France and Germany did just that and, to varying degrees, developed behind trade barriers by nurturing infant industries (2002, p. 10-11). Nowadays, more than ever, it is vital that countries should move away from low productivity sectors like agriculture into high productivity, value added, downstream industries such as manufacturing and services. The Neoliberal model has no scope for such progress and resigns developing countries to perpetually exporting primary produce to the advantage of developed countries.
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Bibliography


Chang, Ha-Joon. Kicking Away The Ladder. London: Anthem Press, 2002.
European Commision For Trade. "Why is trade openness good for development." 3 April 2006. 8 November 2001 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_129992.pdf>.
IMF. Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries. November 2001. 8 November 2011 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm#ii>.
Lewis, Arthur. "Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour." Agarwala A, Singh S.P. The economics of underdevelopment: a series of articles and papers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. 444.
Lipton, Michael. Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.
Vidal, John. Nigeria's agony dwarfs the Gulf oil spill. The US and Europe ignore it. 30 May 2010. 8 November 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/30/oil-spills-nigeria-niger-delta-shell>.
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